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THOUGHTS ON LAWRENCE v. TEXAS
ARTHUR S. LEONARD*

The Supreme Court's June 26, 2003, decision in Lawrence v. Texas may change
everything concerning gay rights and American law, or it may change very little.
One way of seeing it is that by eliminating laws against consensual, private acts
of sodomy by adults, the decision removes the stigma of criminality from gay sex,
opening up the possibility that lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals can attain full and
equal rights of citizenship in this country.2 Another way of seeing it is that by
writing an opinion for the Supreme Court that eschews much of the normal
vocabulary of due process analysis, and by skirting the equal protection issue
raised by the Texas statute,3 Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Jr., has given us a
narrowly-focused opinion that may do away with archaic sodomy laws but is not

particularly helpful in addressing the rest of the gay rights agenda.4 Of course,
the ultimate impact may fall somewhere between these two poles.
As an optimist, I like to think that the former is the case, and that Lawrence v.

Texas will prove helpful in a wide array of contexts and really change just about

everything.
* Professor ofLaw, New York Law School This article is based on remarks delivered as part
of a plenary session panel discussion on Lawrence v. Texas held at the Lavender Law Conference,
Fordham Law School, New York City, October 17, 2003. Some subsequent developments are
noted in footnotes, and the text has been updated to reflect developments through the early
summer of 2004. Faculty research grants from New York Law School underwrote time spent
preparing the original presentation and the updating.
1. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
2. This was certainly the spirit in which the Massachusetts SupremeJudicial Court cited and
quoted from Lawrence at the beginning of its opinion in Goodridgev. Departmentof Public Health, 798
N.E.2d 941,948 (Mass. 2003) (holding that same-sex couples may not be categorically barred from
the institution of marriage, since they are entitled to full tights of citizenship).
3. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (Vernon 1994).
4. U.S. Court of Appeals Judge Stanley Birch made this argument in Lofton v. Secretary of the
Dep't of Children and Fami# Services, 358 F.3d 804, 815-17 (11 th Cir. 2004), petitionfor rehg en banc
denied,377 F.3d 1275 (11 th Cir. 2004) (opining that Lawrence was essentially irrelevant to the question
of whether Florida could categorically ban "homosexuals" from adopting children); See also
Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451,456-57 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (Arizona Court of Appeals
Judge Ann A. Scott Timmer, while acknowledging that Lawrence had recognized the right of gay
people to their choice of intimate sexual partners, refused to read the case more broadly, as
suggested in justice Scalia's dissent in Lawrence, to extend to the right to marry.).
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Lawrence marks the culmination of more than a quarter-century of legal
challenges to sodomy laws, and a half century of intensive efforts at sodomy law
reform. In the 1950s, gay sex was illegal everywhere in the United States, as it
had been since the dawn of our nation.5 The first significant efforts to change
that were asserted behind the scenes by some gay scholars who lobbied
successfully with the legal bigwigs of the American Law Institute, a prestigious
law reform group, to include decriminalization of consensual sodomy among the
reforms to be achieved through the promulgation of the Model Penal Code
(MPC).6 Prior to the MPC, American state criminal law was a hodgepodge of
various common law crimes and idiosyncratic state statutes that had grown up
from the time of our independence into the mid-20th century.7 Determined to
modernize and introduce rationality and uniformity into the criminal law,
American law reformers worked intensively on the project of drafting the MPC
during the 1950s, and agreed, after extensive debate, to a "sex crimes" chapter in
the code that would focus on issues of consent and the distinction between
public and private conduct.8 Sexual activity between adults that was consensual
and private would generally not be subject to state regulation or punishment
through criminal law. 9 There are undoubtedly heroic tales to be told about the
strenuous efforts to include decriminalization of homosexual conduct as part of
the MPC draft, as this was accomplished at a time when "enlightened opinion"
held that homosexuality was a mental illness, and the gay rights movement had
not yet advanced to the public demonstration stage." The official comments
accompanying the MPC decriminalization proposal embodied this "enlightened
opinion," asserting that homosexuality should be treated as a medical issue rather
than a matter for the criminal law."
5. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572.
6. See MODELPENAL CODE, cmt. at 267-81 (Tentative Draft No. 41955) [hereinafter Draft
MPC]; See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 note on status on section (Proposed Official Draft
1962) [hereinafter MPC] at 144-46 (recounting the decision of the council to remove the proposed
section prohibiting consensual sodomy).
7. At the time of American Independence, the early states continued to effect the English
common law crimes.
8. The Supreme Court tells the MPC story briefly in Lawrence. "In 1955 the American Law
Institute promulgated the Model Penal Code and made clear that it did not recommend or provide
for 'criminal penalties for consensual sexual relations conducted in private."' Lawrence, 539 U.S. at
572, (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2, cmt. 2 (1980)). "It justified its decision on three
grounds: (1) The prohibitions undermined respect for the law by penalizing conduct many people
engaged in; (2) the statutes regulated private conduct not harmful to others; and (3) the laws were
arbitrarily enforced and thus invited the danger of blackmail." Id. (citing Draft MPC, at cmt. 277280.) "In 1961 Illinois changed its laws to conform to the Model Penal Code." Id.
9. MPC, supra note 6, at 144-46.
10. These opinions are summarized in the commentary prepared for the council in 1955,
published in Draft MPC, cmt. 276-81.
11. Id.
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The MPC was a "model" put out by a non-governmental group, and it was up
to each state to decide whether to adopt it as proposed, to amend it to satisfy
local legislative preferences, or to ignore it altogether. The first state to adopt the
MPC with the proposed sex crimes chapter was Illinois, 12 which thus became the
first U.S. jurisdiction to decriminalize consensual, private gay sex when its version
of the MPC went into effect in 1962. Some states followed Illinois' lead while
others, like New York, bowed to moralistic objections and amended the MPC to
retain criminal penalties for what was now to be called "deviate sexual
intercourse."' 3 Still other states decided not to join the model laws bandwagon
and to retain their own criminal statutes or common law (non-statutory) criminal
definitions. 4
Meanwhile, a federal constitutional due process revolution, kicked off by the
Supreme Court under the leadership of Chief Justice Earl Warren during the
1950s and 1960s, led law reformers to begin attacking sodomy laws in the courts,
claiming, for example, that states that had not adopted the MPC definition of
"deviate sexual intercourse" were maintaining unconstitutionally vague laws on
their books." Pre-MPC statutes outlawed "the abominable and detestable crime
against nature," or used other euphemisms such as "unnatural acts" to describe
the crime. 6 It was rare for a pre-MPC statute actually to spell out in detail what
body parts had to come into contact to violate the law. None of these pre-MPC
statutes made any distinction between same-sex or opposite-sex conduct, either,
or even as to whether the conduct was public or private. 7 Under Warren Court
precedents requiring that criminal statutes be precise enough so that persons of
ordinary intelligence could tell what acts were prohibited, law reformers charged
into the courts in Florida, Tennessee, and Massachusetts, claiming that the
statutes flunked the vagueness test. 8 They were all unsuccessful, as courts
(including the U.S. Supreme Court) opined that "everybody knows" what was
prohibited, as a result of the application of the statutes in actual cases. 9
Another part of the due process revolution was the willingness of the Warren
Court to find that due process of law required states to have compelling interests
12. Laws 1961, p. 1983, 5 5/11-2 (repealed by P.A. 83-1067, 1984).
13. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.38 (McKinney, 1978) (repealed 2001) (held unconstitutional as
applied to private, consensual adult sexual conduct because it violated the Equal Protection Clause
by applying only to unmarried persons in Peopk v.Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936,942-43 (1980), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 987 (1981)).
14. One example is California, which waited until 1975 to decriminalize private, consensual
adult sexual conduct in the Brown Act of 1975, CAL. PENALCODE §286 (West 2003) (effectiveJuly
1, 1976).
15. Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21 (1973).
16. See Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (1975).
17. Lawrence, supra note 1.
18. Wainwright,414 U.S. 21 (1973); see also Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 318 N.E.2d 478,480
(Mass. 1974); see also
Rose, 423 U.S. at 50-53.
19. See Rose, 423 U.S. at 50.
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at stake if they wanted to restrict individual rights that were deemed
2
"fundamental" to American citizenship. " (This was referred to by legal scholars
as "substantive due process.") Most pertinently, the Supreme Court found in
1965 that Connecticut had violated the Due Process Clause by making it a crime
2
for married persons to use contraceptives to prevent pregnancy, and in 1967
that Virginia had violated both the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection
Clause by forbidding persons of color and "white people" from marrying each
other.22 In both cases, concepts of privacy and individual liberty were violated
because fundamental rights were being abridged without, as far as the Supreme
Court could see, any substantial non-discriminatory justification for doing so.
The religious or moralistic inspiration for both laws was dismissed by the Court
as insufficient to justify a criminal statute. It was not up to the criminal law to
enforce religious precepts.
Thus encouraged, gay rights advocates sought to challenge sodomy laws
during the 1970s, using the same due process theory, but failed in several cases.
Challenges were mounted first in Texas and then in Virginia.' The Texas case
achieved an initial victory at the trial court level in 1970, but the decision was
24
vacated by the Supreme Court on procedural grounds. This litigation did have
the effect of stimulating legislative reform, as Texas repealed its traditional "crime
against nature" felony statute and substituted the Homosexual Conduct Act, thus
decriminalizing sodomy for heterosexuals and reducing the level of the crime
from a felony to a misdemeanor, carrying only a small maximum fine but still
stigma of a criminal record with whatever ramifications might flow
imposing the
25
from that.
The Virginia case was a spectacular defeat, as the trial court rejected the due
process privacy argument, and the Supreme Court affirmed that ruling without
even bothering to order oral argument and issue an opinion, signaling its view
26
that the federal constitutional issues raised by the case were negligible.

20. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
21. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
22. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
23. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for Richmond, Virginia, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va.
1975), srummar aifd without opinion, 425 U.S. 901, rehg denied, 425 U.S. 985 (1976); Buchanan v.
Batchelor, 308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970), vacated and remanded sub nom., Wade v. Buchanan and
Buchanan v. Wade, 401 U.S. 989 (1971).
24. Buchanan, supra note 23.
25. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (Vernon 1994).
26. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975),
summari aft'd without opinion, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), reh'g denied, 425 U.S. 985 (1976).
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Advocates then turned their attention to state courts and proved more
successful in building on the growing body of federal privacy law,27 achieving the
most significant victories in Pennsylvania" and New York. 9
By the early 1980s, the mounting federal privacy precedents led gay rights
advocates back into the federal courts for major challenges against the sodomy
laws of Texas, Georgia, and Louisiana.3" The Georgia case achieved some
success, winning an affirmative ruling from the U.S. Court of Appeals in Atlanta,
but that was overturned by the Supreme Court's notorious Bowers v. Hardwick3
decision in 1986, withJustice Byron White writing for the Court that any attempt
to equate gay sex with the kind of "fundamental rights" that had been protected
under the Due Process Clause was "facetious."32 The Texas case also achieved
some early success, with a sweeping ruling by a federal trial judge in Dallas
striking down the sodomy law as violating both due process and equal protection
(due to its one-sided impact on gay people), but this ruling was reversed by the
federal appeals court, and the Supreme Court declined to review the case after
issuing its Georgia decision.33 The Louisiana challenge was barely under way
when the Hardwick decision was announced, and the litigators decided to
withdraw the case as a strategic retreat.34
During the 1990s, as the Supreme Court appeared to become even more
conservative with the post-Hardwick appointments of two judges, Anthony M.
Kennedy, Jr., and Antonin Scalia, by Ronald Reagan, and two judges, David M.
Souter and Clarence Thomas, by George H.W. Bush, and the elevation of
William H. Rehnquist as ChiefJustice, the sodomy reform movement shifted its
attention back again to the state courts, arguing that state constitutions could be
interpreted to provide more protection for individual privacy than the federal
constitution. They were notably successful in getting sodomy laws struck down
27. The federal privacy law developed in abortion cases for which there was a comfortable
majority through the years of Chief Justice Warren Burger, even though he himself was a frequent
dissenter. See Roe, supra note 20; Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992).
28. Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47 (Pa. 1980).
29. People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980), cert. deniedsub nom., New York v. Onofre,
451 U.S. 987 (1981).
30. Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982), rev'den bane, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986); Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (11th Cir. 1985) rev'd,
Bowers v. Hardwick, 476 U.S. 186 (1986); Ward v. Connick (E.D. La.) There is no citation for this
case because the case was withdrawn following the Supreme Court's decision in Bowers.
31. Bowers, supra note 30.
32. Id.
at 194.
33. Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982), rev'den bane,769 F.2d 289 (5"' Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986).
34. Ward v. Connick (E.D. La.). The author was a member of the Legal Committee at
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund at the relevant time and participated in discussions
about the filing and withdrawal of the Louisiana sodomy law challenge.
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by the appellate courts in several states,3" and litigation involving heterosexual
sodomy prosecutions, 36 as well as further legislative repeals, had, by the end of
the decade, reduced the number of sodomy laws on the books to barely more
than a dozen, of which only a handful specifically targeted same-sex conduct.37
By the end of the 1990s, the gay rights litigators had concluded that it was time
to resume the inclusion of federal constitutional claims in their state sodomy law
cases, because the U.S. Supreme Court had issued two decisions during the 1990s
that gave many legal observers hope that there were at least five votes on the
38
In
Court to strike down sodomy laws on federal constitutional grounds.
addition, President Bill Clinton appointed two justices, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
Stephen Breyer, whose prior opinions on the federal courts of appeals indicated
receptivity to gay rights arguments.39 Even though these cases were in state
courts, an adverse decision from the highest state appeals court on the federal
constitutional arguments could be appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
The two fateful federal constitutional decisions were Planned Parenthoodof
SoutheasternPenngylvania v. Case and Romer v. Evans.4 Casey was supposed to be
the right-wing's vehicle to overrule Roe v. Wade 42 and put an end to constitutional
protection for women's right to abortion, but a centrist group of Republican
appointees consisting of Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Jr., Sandra Day
O'Connor, and David Souter43 rallied around a concept of "liberty" under the
Due Process Clause as an anchor for continued protection of that intimate
personal decision.' Their jointly-signed opinion contained rhetoric in support
of individual autonomy and choice that was very suggestive for those dedicated
to overturning Bowers v. Hardwick.45 For example, in a portion of the opinion
widely believed to have been written by Justice Kennedy appears the following
35. See, e.g., Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332 (Ark. 2002); Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112
(Mont. 1997); Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. App. 1996); Commonwealth v.
Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).
36. See, e.g., Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998) (sodomy law that was upheld inBowers
declared unconstitutional under state Due Process Clause inprosecution for heterosexual oral sex).
37. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573. "The 25 States with laws prohibiting the relevant conduct
referenced in the Bowers decision are reduced now to 13, of which 4 enforce their laws only against
homosexual conduct." Id.
38. Casey, 505 U.S. at 850; Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).

39. As to Justice Ginsburg, see Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacateden bancsub
nom.; Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994). As to Breyer, see Matthews v. Marsh, 755 F.2d
182 (1st Cir. 1985) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
40. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
41. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
42. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
43. Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Jr. and Sandra Day O'Connor were both appointed by
President Reagan, and Justice David Souter was appointed by the first President Bush.
44. Cas,, 505 U.S. at 845-47.
45. Id. at 846-53.
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helpful assertion: "It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of
personal liberty which the government may not enter."'
On top of that, the 1996 decision in Romer v. Evans marked the first major gay
rights victory in the Supreme Court in a generation.4" The opinion by Justice
Kennedy, declaring unconstitutional Colorado's infamous Amendment 2,48 again
contained language suggesting sympathy for the right of gay people to be treated
as equal citizens of the United States and not to be singled out for invidious
treatment by the government.49 The Court specifically rejected the idea that
"moral disapproval" of homosexuality by voters or legislators was a sufficient
justification to treat gay people as "unequal to everyone else." 50 In a fulminating
dissent,Justice Antonin Scalia heatedly contended that the rulingwas inconsistent
with Bowers v. Hardwick, which the Court's opinion had neither specifically
overruled nor attempted to distinguish."'
Thus, when the ideal test case came along in Texas, 2 the gay rights lawyers at
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, 3 called in to represent the
defendants, did not hesitate to raise federal constitutional claims as part of their
defense. And when the Texas Court of Appeals refused to strike down the
Homosexual Conduct Law, citing Bowers v. Hardwick as its main authority, 4
Lambda petitioned the Supreme Court specifically to overrule Bowers, as well as

46. Casy, 505 U.S. at 847.
47. Romer, 517 U.S. at 620. The previous great victory was an early 1960's decision holding
that gay literature was not necessarily obscene, and therefore could be distributed through the mail;
it was a decision necessary to the birth of the nationally distributed gay print media. Manual
Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962); ONE, Inc. v. Oleson, 355 U.S. 371 (1958), summari rrvg
241 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1957).
48. COL. CONST. art. I, § 30b (1993). The amendment intended to bar either the state or its
counties or cities from passing gay rights protections.
49. Romer, 517 U.S. at 620.
50. Id. at 635.
51. Id. at 636. Indeed, the majority decision did not even mention Bowers. Seegeneral!y id.
52. Lawrence was an ideal test case because it was a criminal prosecution of two male adults
who were arrested while engaging in consensual sex in a private, residential apartment. Lawrence, 539
U.S. at 562-63. Police officers came into the apartment through an unlocked door in response to
a third party's report of suspicious activity. Id. Thus, the case presented none of the usual
complications found in sodomy law challenges stemming from actual arrests, such as public
solicitation, public sexual acts, involvement of minors, possible lack of consent, or supervening
Fourth Amendment violations by the police officers.
53. Local counsel, Mitchell Katine, represented the defendants in the initial state court
proceedings, Lawrence v. Texas, 41 S.W.3d 349, 350 (Tex. Ct. App. 14th Dist. 2001), and Lambda
staff attorneys took over primary responsibility for the case at the appellate level. Lawrence, 539 U.S.
at 561.
54. Lawrence, supra note 53.
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to declare55 the law unconstitutional on both due process and equal protection
grounds.
Both of these constitutional theories were potentially in play, and both could
be very important for future gay rights battles, although it was probably equal
protection that was more important in the long run, since it related more directly
to many of the remaining gay rights issues, notably other forms of governmental
discrimination, including marriage, parental rights (custody, visitation and
adoption), military service, immigration rights for partners, equal benefits rights,
tax status discrimination, and so forth. A case challenging the Homosexual
Conduct Law seemed the ideal vehicle to prod the Supreme Court to take a
substantial crack at the equal protection issue, since the Texas law appeared
discriminatory on its face, penalizing conduct when performed by same-sex
partners that was left free of criminal prosecution when performed by oppositesex partners. 6 Although gay legal observers had hailed the 1996 victory in Romer,
the opinion in that equal protection victory had failed to engage in a traditional
equal protection analysis, characterizing Amendment 2 as an enactment of a type
57
that "defied" such analysis due to its breadth and irrationality. Perhaps Lawrence
would provide the kind of analysis that had not materialized in Romer.
But it was not to be. The big gay rights victory-and, make no mistake, it is
a big gay rights victory for more than just symbolic reasons-appeared, to judge
by Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court, to be grounded solely in due process.
Furthermore, eschewing the controversial language of "privacy" and
"fundamental rights," Kennedy devoted most of his opinion to demonstrating
why Bowers was "incorrect" when it was decided, and only at the end, almost as
an afterthought, gave a brief, generalized justification for striking down the Texas
8
law as a violation of the "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause."
55.
56.
57.
58.
"holding"
presented

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564.
The Homosexual Conduct Law, 5 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. S 21.06(a) (Vernon 1994).
Romer, 517 U.S. at 621.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. The paragraph that can narrowly be characterized as the
of the Court seems more concerned with narrowing the focus of the specific question
than with stating a broad principle of constitutional rights. Kennedy wrote:
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who
might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent
might not easily be refused. It does not involve public conduct or
prostitution. It does not involve whether the government must give formal
recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter. The
case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each
other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The
petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot
demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual
conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives
them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the
government. "It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of
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Kennedy briefly acknowledged that Lambda had also challenged the law under
the Equal Protection Clause, and described such challenge as "a tenable
argument," but dismissed it as a basis for this case, asserting that an equal
protection ruling would not make it clear that all sodomy laws had to fail as a
violation of "liberty."5'9 Furthermore, he correctly stated, striking down all the
sodomy laws took care of any lingering equal protection problems that they
might pose, in any event, so it was not necessary for the Court to address the
equal protection issue.60 And he intimated that the Court's ruling did not
necessarily decide whether the government had an obligation to recognize samesex unions. 61
There was one more vote to strike down the Texas law, from Justice
O'Connor, and her opinion includes a suggestive discussion of how the Court
62
might treat the equal protection issue in the gay rights cases to come.
As the Court has developed its equal protection analysis, the question whether
a challenged government policy is found constitutional turns heavily on whether
it uses a "suspect classification" as a basis for unequal treatment, or whether it
provides for unequal treatment regarding a "fundamental right." A government
policy that involves either of those is presumptively unconstitutional, and a heavy
burden is placed on the government to prove that the policy is necessary and
narrowly-tailored to achieve compelling governmental interests. 63
When
government policies involve classifications that are not suspect, or interests that
are not "fundamental," the Court presumes the policies to be constitutional and
places the burden on the challenger to show that the policies bear no rational
relationship to any legitimate government interest.6' The Court has identified
"sex" as a classification falling somewhere along the scale between "suspect" and
"not suspect," looking to the state to justify government policies that treat people
differently based on their sex by showing an important interest that the policy
6
advances in order to support its constitutionality.
personal liberty which the government may not enter." The Texas statute
furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the
personal and private life of the individual.
Id. (citations omitted).
59. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574-75.

60. Id.
61. Id. at 578. The bulk of Kennedy's opinion, devoted to showing why Bowers had been
wrongly decided, provided the source of expansive quotes about liberty and sexual privacy that have
been relied upon by some judges in subsequent cases to give Lawrence broader precedential weight,
while those who seek to restrict its scope cite the paragraph quoted at supra note 58.
62. Id. at 579-85 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
63. This test is referred to as "strict scrutiny."
64. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579. This test is referred to as "rational basis review" or "rationality
review," and is considered the least demanding form of judicial review in terms of its deference to
legislative preferences.
65. Perhaps the most enlightening discussion of the equal protection analysis in a Supreme
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The Court has never directly analyzed whether "sexual orientation" is a
suspect classification. In Romer,it found the Colorado constitutional amendment
so lacking in rational justification that there was no need, for purposes of
deciding the case, to analyze more generally how the burdens of proof and
justification should be allocated in equality cases involving sexual orientation.66
In subsequent decisions, some lower federal courts have invoked Romer as
supporting the view that anti-gay government policies are presumptively valid,
and the burden is on the challenger to show they are irrational.67 It is much more
difficult to win a challenge to an anti-gay policy when the challenger starts from
such a disadvantageous constitutional position. Romer itself shows that it is not
impossible to win, but Romer was an extraordinary case, as Justice Kennedy's
opinion suggests. Lawrence provided the Court with an excellent opportunity to
engage in a more detailed, substantive discussion of the type of judicial review
appropriate for claims that government policies unconstitutionally discriminate
on the ground of sexual orientation.
In her concurring opinion in Lawrence, Justice O'Connor, who had voted with
the majority in Bowers, declined to join in overruling that decision, and declined
to join in declaring that the Texas Homosexual Conduct Law violates the Due
Process Clause, but contended that it violates the Equal Protection Clause.68
Reviewing the Court's equal protection precedents, she classified Romertogether
with a few other cases where the Court has declared unconstitutional various
government policies that did not involve "fundamental rights" or "suspect
classifications," finding as their common core that the challenged policies were
motivated by "a bare... desire to harm a politically unpopular group," and where
"the challenged legislation inhibits personal relationships." 69 Certainly, a law
criminalizing same-sex intimacy "inhibits personal relationships" and is aimed at
a "politically unpopular" group. For such cases, O'Connor stated, the Court
would engage in a "more searching" form of rational basis review. 0

Court opinion was written by Justice Byron White in Cleburne v. CkburneLiving Center, Inc., 473 U.S.
432, 439-40 (1985), from which justice O'Connor cited and quoted in her Lawrence concurrence.
539 U.S. at 579-85.

66. Romer, 517 U.S. at 620.
67. The prime example of this is Loton v. Sect ofthe Dep't of Children andFami# Sen's., 358 F.3d
804 (11th Cir. 2004), petiionfor rehg en banc denied, 377 F.3d 1275 (11th Cit. 2004) (rejecting the
argument that Florida's categorical ban on gay people adopting children should be subjected to any
heightened form of judicial scrutiny.). See also Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of
Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997); Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir.

1997).
68. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 580.
70. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580. The cases upon which justice O'Connor relied, in addition to
Romer, were Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440; Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534, (1973);
Nord'nger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 11-12, (1992).
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The equal protection issue thus joined, O'Connor turned to the state's
proffered justification for the law. In this case, Texas argued that it was
necessary to outlaw homosexual conduct in order to promote morality.71 This
was essentially the winning argument Georgia made in Bowers, the case in which
Justice O'Connor voted to reject the constitutional challenge.7 2 But she saw a
sharp distinction when morality was raised in an equal protection context. Moral
disapproval of this group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is an interest that
is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause,
she asserted.73 Why? "[B]ecause legal classifications must not be 'drawn for the
purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law,"' she answered,
quoting from Romer.74 In other words, a legislature can adopt a policy that has
the effect of discriminating against a particular group, if the motivation for
adopting the policy is some legitimate motivation other than specifically to
discriminate against that group. This is, perhaps, a long way around to saying
that groups whose common identifying trait centers on a non-suspect
classification may have a constitutional claim when the legislature specifically
singles them out for disparate treatment, but not when the legislature adopts a
policy for other reasons that has the incidental effect of disadvantaging them.
"[T]he Equal Protection Clause prevents a State from creating 'a classification of
persons
undertaken for its own sake,"' she continued, again quoting from
75
Romer.

The rest of her opinion was devoted to showing that the Texas legislature had
been specifically motivated to legislate against homosexuals when it adopted the
law; it was an easy case to make, especially in light of the name given to the law
by the legislature.76 She did take care, in response to Justice Scalia's dissent, to
emphasize her view that this decision did not decide the case of same-sex
marriage, since "preserving the traditional institution of marriage" could be seen
as a "legitimate state interest" that was "beyond mere moral disapproval of an
excluded group." 77 This comment drew the scorn of Justice Scalia, who argued
indissent that the Lawrence ruling opened the door to same-sex marriage and
spelled the end of all "morals" legislation.78

71. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583.
72. Bowers, supra note 30 (overmed by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)).

73. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583.
74. Id. at 583 (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 633).
75. Id. (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 635).
76. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring.) Justice O'Connor specifically rejected the state's
disingenuous argument that the Homosexual Conduct Law did not discriminate against
homosexuals as a group because it also outlawed "homosexual conduct" by heterosexuals, i.e., two
straight men or women engaging in oral or anal sex with each other. Id.
77. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 585.
78. Id. at 599.
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But what is the meaning of Lawrence for future gay rights litigation? Removing
the stigma of criminality from gay relations will undoubtedly be helpful in an
array of cases, although it is well to remember that statutes other than sodomy
laws have contributed to such stigma. The decriminalization of sodomy in
Illinois in 1962 did not suddenly liberate the gay people of that state from
oppressive state policing of their sex lives. The MPC still provided criminal
' 79
penalties for "soliciting" somebody to engage in "deviate sexual intercourse,
and such laws have long been the main vehicle for law enforcement to crack
down on gay meeting places and to arrest gay men. ° Even in the post-Lawrence
world, such laws still bedevil gay people. For example, on August 6, 2003, the
California 3rd District Court of Appeal upheld a decision by the California Real
Estate Commissioner to deny a real estate broker's license to a gay man on
morality grounds because he had twice been arrested for soliciting a plainclothes
8
police officer to engage in "deviate sexual intercourse" in a public restroom. '
The statutes under which such arrests take place are not specifically anti-gay
statutes, but they are clearly enforced as such, since plainclothes police officers
generally do not lurk about public restrooms enticing heterosexuals to solicit
them for sex and then arresting them. Twenty-five years ago, a California
appellate court took judicial notice of research showing that those
arrested under
82
such laws were almost exclusively men seeking sex with men.
But on to the broader gay rights agenda, what does Lawrence mean for samesex marriage? For gay parental rights to custody, visitation, or adoption? For an
end to discriminatory treatment under immigration laws, tax laws, public benefits
laws such as Social Security and military regulations? Does it portend a more
expansive use of the "liberty" mentioned in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to subject a wider range of governmental restrictions on individual
rights to some form of heightened scrutiny, even in cases where the Court's

79. E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35 (McKinney, 1978), which was declared unconstitutional
by the New York Court of Appeals in Peopk v. Up'nger,447 N.E.2d 62 (N.Y. 1983), cert. dismissed as
improvident#granted,467 U.S. 246 (1984).
80. Criminal prosecution of lesbians for violating sodomy laws is so rare that it is difficult to
find case citations, but sodomy laws have routinely been invoked as grounds for discriminating
against them. The most notorious case of this is Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cit. 1987)
(upholding the Federal Bureau of Investigation's refusal to hire a lesbian on the ground that it was
rational for a federal law enforcement agency to refuse to employ a person whose sex fife would be
illegal in half the states); see also Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1110-11 (11 th Cit. 1997), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 693 (1997) (upholding the Attorney General of Georgia's revocation of a job offer
from a young lesbian attorney, on the ground that it would confuse the public for the state's chief
law enforcement officer to employ an attorney whose sex life violated the state's felony sodomy

law).
81. Hardenv. Zinnemann, No. C042848,2003 WL21802259 at*1 (Cal. Ct. App., 3rd Dist.,
Aug. 6, 2003).
82. Pryor v. Municipal Court for Los Angeles County, 599 P.2d 636, 644 (Cal. 1979).
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traditional tests based on history would not find a fundamental right at stake?
Will Lawrence lead to "heightened scrutiny" for gay equal protection claims?
The Supreme Court provided a hint when, shortly after announcing its
opinion in Lawrence, it took action in the pending case of Limon v. Kansas.83
Matthew Limon, then 18 years old, received a 17-year prison sentence for
initiating sexual contact with a younger teenager when both were residents of a
state group home.' Under Kansas law, the penalty for sex with a slightly-underage female would have been minimal by comparison."5 The ACLU argued that
this violated Limon's constitutional rights.8 6 The Kansas courts disagreed and
upheld the sentence, finding that the state could rationally impose harsher
penalties for homosexual contact between an "adult" and a "minor," relying upon
Bowers.17 The Supreme Court granted Limon's petition, vacated the Kansas
ruling, and sent the case back for reconsideration "in light of Lawrence v. Texas, '
signaling that Lawrence has some potential precedential application to the situation
presented by Limon's conviction and sentencing.
On the one hand, Limon seems closely analogous to Lawrence in that the
Kansas law, like the Texas law, specifically targets gays for harsher penalties. But
it is unlike the Texas law in that Kansas still imposes criminal penalties on
straight inter-generational sex,89 albeit lesser penalties than are imposed for samesex conduct, whereas the Texas law allowed heterosexuals to have anal or oral sex
without penalty. What was the Court trying to signal here? That the "liberty"
interest identified in Lawrence may extend to inter-generational sex? This seems
unlikely. More likely, the Court was trying to signal that Lawrence, viewed in the
context of prior cases, including Romer, signals that moral disapproval of
homosexuality may no longer be the basis for a state differentiating between
same-sex conduct and opposite-sex conduct. That is, a majority of the Court
may see Lawrence as incorporating an equal protection component in its holding
as a logical extension of its due process holding. This would be fully consistent
83. 41 P.3d 303 (Kan. App. 2002) (unpublished disposition), cert.granted,vacated and remanded
for reconsideration, 539 U.S. 955 (2003) originaldecision reafd, 83 P.3d 229 (Kans. App. 2004), cert.

granted,2004 Kan. LEXIS 284, at *1 (May 25, 2004).
84. Limon v. Kansas, 83 P.3d 229, 232 (Kan. App. 2004).
85. Id.at 232-33. Limon was convicted of violating KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505(a)(2) (1999),
a level 3 person felony. Had his sexual partner been an underage girl, his crime would have come
under KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3522(a)(2) (1999), the so-called "Romeo and Juliet Law," a level 9
person felony. The presumptive sentence for conviction under the former is a lengthy prison term,
while the presumptive sentence for conviction under the latter is probation. In Limon's case, prior
scrapes with the law produced an even lengthier sentence than the presumptive one under the
harsher statute. See the court of appeals dissent by Judge Pierron for an explanation. Limon, 41
P.3d at 390 (Pierron, J., dissenting).
86. Limon, 83 P.3d at 232.
87. Id.
88. Limon, 539 U.S. at 955.
89. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3522(a)(2) (1999).
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with the Court's view that the guarantee of due process in the Fifth Amendment
imposes a requirement of equal protection on the federal government that is coextensive with the equal protection requirement imposed on the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment's express terms, 9° and is implicit in Justice Kennedy's
comment that deciding Lawrence on due process grounds takes care of any equal
protection issues raised by the Texas law. 9'
Of course, this does not guarantee that lower federal courts or state courts will
understand the relevance of Lawrence to such issues, as the initial decision on
remand to the Kansas courts in Limon has demonstrated.92 A majority of the
Kansas Court of Appeals three-judge panel, focusing on the brief paragraph at
the end of Justice Kennedy's decision that specified that the Lawrence case was
not about sex involving minors, concluded that Lawrence was not relevant to its
disposition of the case, to the consternation of a dissenting judge.93 The majority
totally missed the point that Lawrence is about due process in its fullest sense,
which includes the equal protection obligation implicit in a requirement of
fundamental fairness.
What might Lawrence mean for other heavily contested issues in gay rights? Is
Justice Scalia correct in arguing that Lawrence severely undermines the case against
same-sex marriage, or is Justice O'Connor correct in asserting that the state's
interest in "preserving the traditional institution of marriage" may be enough of
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason to withstand the "more searching" judicial
review that she finds appropriate for state policies that "inhibit personal
relationships"? O'Connor might argue that the denial of marriage to same-sex
couples does not "inhibit" their personal relationships, as striking down the
sodomy law allows them to have sex and live together in a joint household free
of any state interference, and the disadvantages they suffer by being excluded
from marriage are incidental and unintended consequences of the state's desire
to nurture a historically-sanctioned opposite-sex relationship.
One presumes, on the other hand, that the Supreme Court's Lawrence majority
would find unconstitutional statutes such as the Virginia laws against "fornication
and cohabitation,"' which have been applied against opposite-sex couples living
together without benefit of marriage, as violating the same "liberty" right
identified in Lawrence. Would O'Connor find these laws unconstitutional? Maybe
not, since they are not "discriminatory" in the sense she identified in her Lawrence
concurrence.

90. Boling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
91. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574-75.
92. Limon, 83 P.3d at 303.
93. Limon, 83 P.3d at 234-35.
94. VA. CODEANN. §§ 18.2-344 and 345 (Michie 1950); See Doe v. Duling, 603 F. Supp. 960
(E.D. Va. 1985), vacated,782 F.2d 1202 (4th Cit. 1986) (rejecting constitutional challenge in test case
litigation brought by opposite-sex cohabiting couple).
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And what about military service? Clearly, the 1993 enactment of the "don't
ask, don't tell" policy was specifically motivated to keep openly-gay people out
of uniformed military service. 95 The articulated justification-to promote unit
cohesion and morale-was not expressly based on moral disapproval by
Congress,96 but rather on the contention by military commanders who testified
before Congress that the presence of openly gay personnel would undermine the
military mission because other service members could not (or would not) be able
to bond with gay co-workers as fellow warriors. 9' The key question under equal
protection theory is the degree of skepticism that a court should bring to
evaluating this reasoning. If anti-gay discrimination, especially intentional rather
than incidental anti-gay discrimination, is in some sense suspect, then the
government should have to do more than assert this contention, as it has never
been backed up by any credible social science research and is belied by the
experience of many of our major military allies who have ended the gay ban for
a decade or more. 98 Of course, the traditional judicial deference to military
"expertise" in personnel matters gets in the way of a pure equal protection
analysis as well. 99
What could Lawrence mean for the parental rights of gay people? In some
jurisdictions judges have routinely cited sodomy laws to cast gay parents into
inferior positions in custody and visitation disputes, regardless of their
°°
comparative merits as desirable custodians or role models for their children."
The removal of sodomy laws takes away that rationalization. But what about the
judges who find it preferable for children not to be placed with parents who are
the subject of community moral disapproval, or judges who continue to see
homosexual relationships as "illicit" even in jurisdictions where sodomy laws
have long since been repealed or invalidated, or judges who believe that children
95. 10 U.S.C.A. § 654 (West 1993).
96. Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628, 634 (2d Cit. 1998). Some members of Congress
stated their individual moral disapproval for homosexuality. For example, Rep. Floyd Spence of
South Carolina, then the ranking Republican on the House Armed Services Committee, described
homosexuality as "unnatural, immoral as well as being illegal in some states." Donna Cassata, Tighter
Limits on Gays OK'd;House Miitagy Can'tAfford Risk, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Sept. 29, 1993, available
at 1993 WLNR 16 32405.
97. Able, 155 F.3d at 634.
98. Among prominent U.S. military allies that allow openly gay personnel to serve in the
military are the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and Israel.
99. See, e.g.,Able, 155 F.3d at 632-33, in which the district court had found the military policy
unconstitutional, but the court of appeals reversed and upheld the policy, based primarily on the
argument that normal analysis of constitutionally protected individual rights must give way to
traditional judicial deference to military expertise in matters of military personnel policy.
100. One Florida judge thought that a father who was a murder convict was automatically a
more desirable parent than a lesbian mother, for example, even though consensual sodomy was a
mere misdemeanor in Florida while homicide was a felony. Ward v. Ward, 742 So. 2d 250,255 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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are best off with the heterosexual parent who has remarried and can give the
child a home with a traditional opposite-sex parental dyad as role models? What
about all the judges who will only allow a gay parent to have visitation if their
same-sex partner is excluded from any contact with the child? How will these
cases fare under Lawrence? Would Justice O'Connor's "more searching" judicial
review be relevant here, when the issue is not a statute specifically disadvantaging
gay people, but rather judicial attitudes deployed in the exercise of relatively
unsupervised "discretion" in a system where appellate courts are generally loathe
to second-guess the front-line decision-makers? The Supreme Court has yet to
take on a gay parenting dispute of any type, and its failure to confront the equal
protection doctrinal issue in Lawrence forestalls the day when we can confidently
answer that question.
What does Lawrence mean for the eventual fate of the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA),10' the mean-spirited statute passed by Congress in 1996 in an electionyear frenzy of reaction against the looming possibility that Hawaiian courts might
rule in favor of same-sex marriage? Just months after DOMA was passed, their
worst fears seemed to come true when a Hawaii trial judge ordered the state to
issue marriage licenses to three same-sex couples. 10 2 But the court's order was
stayed pending appeal and the people of Hawaii amended their constitution to
give their legislature the right to reject same-sex marriage. 3 Here is a federal
statute that surely would merit "searching review" from Justice O'Connor, in
light of its legislative history. Does Congress have a legitimate interest in
"defending" the "traditional institution of marriage" against same-sex partners
who might be married in Canada or Massachusetts, civilly united in Vermont,
domestically-partnered in California, reciprocally-beneficiaried (now, there's a
neologism) in Hawaii, seeking equal treatment under federal immigration, tax, or
benefits laws, when DOMA was clearly passed for the valuable election-year
political purpose of going on record against a politically unpopular minority?
These remain open questions.
Lawrence v. Texas could have been the vehicle to begin addressing many of
these concerns, but the way in which Justice Kennedy wrote the Court's opinion
falls short of providing a clear roadmap for analyzing the constitutional
questions. Justice Scalia's frustration at the lack of clear constitutional analysis
101. The operative provisions of DOMA are codified at 1 U.S.C.A. § 7 (West 1996) (definition
of "marriage" for all purposes of federal law) and 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (West 1996) (purporting to
relieve states of any obligation under the Full Faith and Credit Clause to recognize same-sex
marriages performed in other states).
102. Baehr v. Miike, Civ. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. 1996) (not officially
published).
103. HAW.CONST. art. I, § 23 (1998). "The legislature shall have the power to reserve
marriage to opposite-sex couples." (Added by H.B. 117 [1997], and election Nov. 3, 1998.) For
a historical account, see David 0. Coolidge, The Hawai'iMarriageAmendment: Its Origins,Meaningand
Fate,22 U. RAw. L. REv. 19 (2000).
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in the opinion is understandable from this perspective. It is hard to hit a target
that lies concealed behind mist and generalizations about "liberty." Perhaps
Justice Kennedy concluded, as a strategic matter, that in such an emotionally
charged case, it was best to "leave 'em guessing," and that's where he has left us.

